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Abstract: this paper addresses the issue of the relation between the system efficiency and the individual 
performance with different combinations of agent memory lengths in mix-game model which is an 
extension of minority game (MG). In mix-game, there are two groups of agents; group1 plays the majority 
game, but the group2 plays the minority game. The average winnings of agents can represent the average 
individual performance and the volatility of a system can represent the efficiency of the system. It is found 
the correlations between the average winnings of agents and the medians of local volatilities are different 
when agent memory lengths change with different combinations of m1=m2, m1<m2=6 and m2<m1=6. 
This paper also gives some suggestions for designing complex competing systems.  
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1. Introduction  
A designer or a manager who design or manage competing systems which consist of 
heterogeneous agents who compete constantly for limited resources, such as different species 
in an ecological system, traders in financial markets, drivers on city roads and highways or 
users accessing a computer network – faces problems of coordination since selfish agents in 
such systems all want to optimize their performances and individual goals will most certainly 
be conflicting. If he or she hopes to balance the individual performance and the efficiency of 
the system, he or she needs to know the relationship between the individual performance and 
the efficiency of the system. However, the interplay between the state of optimal individual 
performance and the reach of a globally efficient phase where the collective use of resources 
is optimal may be quite subtle [1, 2]. Therefore, the study of this issue has both theoretical 
and practical importance, which can reveal how the macroscopic properties of a system may 
emerge from the microscopic interaction of agents and under which conditions, and this 
understanding may help for designing or managing of complex systems.  
Agent-based models can be used to address directly the relation between microscopic 
behavior of agents and macroscopic properties of a system (like fluctuations, predictability 
and efficiency) [1, 2]. In article [2], I studied the correlations of the average winnings of 
agents and the volatilities of systems based on mix-game model [3, 4, 5] which is an 
extension of minority game (MG) [6, 7, 8]. In mix-game, there are two groups of agents; the 
group1 plays the majority game [9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14 15, 16], but the group2 plays the 
minority game. The results show that the correlations between the average winnings of agents 
and the mean of local volatilities are different with different combinations of agents’ memory 
lengths when the proportion of agents in group1 increases. The average winnings of agents 
can represent the average individual performance and the volatility of a system can represent 
the efficiency of the system. Therefore, these results imply that the combinations of agents’ 
memory lengths largely influence the relation between the system efficiency and the average 
individual performance.   
In this paper, I further address this issue by examining how the combinations of agents’ 
memory lengths influence the relation between the system efficiency and the average 
individual performance. This paper is organized as following. Section 2 describes the 
mix-game model and the simulation conditions. Section 3 presents the simulation results and 
the results of the quantitative correlations. Section 4 discusses the results. In section 5, the 
conclusion is reached. 
2. The model and simulation conditions 
Mix-game model is an extension of minority game (MG) so its structure is similar to MG. 
In mix-game, there are two groups of agents; the group1 plays the majority game, and the 
group2 plays the minority game. N (odd number) is the total number of the agents and N1 is 
number of agents in group1. The system resource is r=N*L, where L<1 is the proportion of 
resource of the system. All agents compete in the system for the limited resource r. T1 and T2 
are the time horizon lengths of the two groups of agents, and m1 and m2 denote the memory 
lengths of the two groups of agents, respectively.   
The global information only available to the agents is a common bit-string “memory” of the 
m1 or m2 most recent competition outcomes (1 or 0). A strategy consists of a response, i.e., 0 
(sell) or 1 (buy), to each possible bit string; hence there are 
122
m
or 
222
m
 possible strategies 
for group 1 or group 2, respectively, which form full strategy spaces (FSS). At the beginning 
of the game, each agent is assigned s strategies and keeps them unchangeable during the game. 
After each turn, agents assign one (virtual) point to a strategy which would have predicted the 
correct outcome. For agents in group 1, they will reward their strategies one point if they are 
in the majority; for agents in group 2, they will reward their strategies one point if they are in 
the minority. Agents collect the virtual points for their strategies over the time horizon T1 or 
T2, and they use their strategy which has the highest virtual point in each turn. If there are two 
strategies which have the highest virtual point, agents use coin toss to decide which strategy 
to be used. Excess demand is equal to the number of ones (buy) which agents choose minus 
the number of zeros (sell) which agents choose. According to a widely accepted assumption 
that excess demand exerts a force on the price of the asset and the change of price is 
proportion to the excess demand in a financial market [17, 18, 19], the time series of price of 
the asset can be calculated based on the time series of excess demand.  
In simulation, the distribution of initial strategies of agents is randomly distributed in the 
full strategy space and keeps unchanged during the game. Simulation turns are 3000. Total 
number of agents is 201. Number of strategies per agent is 2.  
3. Simulation results and discussion 
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Fig.1 medians of local volatilities vs. different memory length of group1 or group 2 (m1 or m2), Vol.1 
representing medians of local volatilities of m2=6, T1=T2=12, N=201, N1=72, s=2 and m1 varying from 1 
to 6; Vol.2 representing medians of local volatilities of m1=6, T1=T2=12, N=201, N1=72, s=2 and m2 
varying from 1 to 6; Vol.3 representing medians of local volatilities of m1=m2, T1=T2=12, N=201, N1=72, 
s=2.  
Volatility of the time series of prices is represented by the variance of the increases of 
prices. The local volatilities are calculated at every timestep by calculating the variance of the 
increases of prices within a small timestep window. The window length of local volatility is 5 
in Fig.1. From Fig.1, one can find that the medians of local volatilities (Vol.1 and Vol.2) 
increase while the memory length m1 or m2 decreases from 6 to 1 in both simulation 
situations. But the difference is that Vol.2 is much larger than Vol.1 when m1 or m2 is smaller 
than 5. This means that agents with larger memory length playing majority game make the 
systems less efficient. Vol.3 represents the medians of local volatilities when m1 is equal to 
m2 and they increase from 1 to 6 and it is similar to Vol.1.  
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Fig.2 average winnings per agent per turn for Mix-game vs. different memory length of group1 when m2=6, 
T1=T2=12, N=201, N1=72 and s=2. R1 represents the average winning per agent per turn in group1, and R2 
represents the average winning per agent per turn in group2. 
 
Table 1 the correlations among R1, R2 and Vol.1 when m2=6, and m1 increases from 1 to 6 
  R 1 R 2 Vol.1 
R 1 1   
R 2 0.982427 1  
Vol.1 0.935162 0.954744 1
From Fig. 2, one can find that the average winnings (R1 and R2) of these two groups 
increase when m1 decreases from 6 to 1 and R1 increases much more quickly than R2. The 
average winning of group1 (R1) is larger than that of group2 (R2). Comparing Fig.1 with 
Fig.2, one can find that the median of local volatilities (Vol.1) increases when m1 decreases 
from 6 to 1 under the condition of m2=6, T1=T2=12, N=201, N1=72, s=2, accompanying 
with the increase of the average winnings of group1 and group2 (R1, R2). Table 1 shows that 
correlations are among R1, R2 and Vol.1 are largely positive. These results mean that the 
improvement of the performance of individual agents accompanies with the decrease of the 
efficiency of systems under this simulation condition. Agents can benefit from the larger 
fluctuation of systems, especially for agents in group1. This is accordant with the reality of 
financial markets. 
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Fig.3 average winnings per agent per turn for Mix-game vs. different memory length of group2 when m1=6, 
T1=T2=12, N=201, N1=72 and s=2. R1, R2 have the same meaning as indicated in Fig.2. 
Table 2 correlations among R1, R2 and Vol.2 when m1=6, and m2 increases from 1 to 6 
correlation R1 R2 Vol.2 
R1 1   
R2 -0.246 1  
Vol.2 0.187 -0.899 1 
From Fig. 3, one can find that the average winning of group2 (R2) decreases when m2 
decreases from 6 to 1 while the average winning of group1 (R1) does not change greatly. The 
average winning of group1 (R1) is much larger than that of group2 (R2) and the agents in 
group1 don’t influence the average real winnings of agents in group2 in this simulation 
condition [5].  
Comparing Fig.3 with Fig.1, one can notice that the median of local volatilities (Vol.2) 
increases when m2 decreases from 6 to 1 under the condition of m1=6, T1=T2=12, N=201, 
N1=72, s=2, accompanying with the decrease of the average winning of group2 (R2) and 
nearly stable average winning of group1 (R1). Table 2 shows that the average winning of 
group2 (R2) strongly negatively correlated with the volatilities of systems (Vol.2), but the 
average winning of group1 (R1) just slightly positively correlated with the volatilities of 
systems (Vol.2).  
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Fig.4 average winnings per agent per turn for Mix-game vs. different memory length of group2 when 
m1=m2, T1=T2=12, N=201, N1=72 and s=2. R1, R2 have the same meaning as indicated in Fig.2. 
 
Table 3 correlations among R1, R2 and Vol.3 when m1=m2, and they increase from 1 to 6  
 R1 R2 Vol.3 
R1 1   
R2 0.976722 1  
Vol.3 -0.80357 -0.66474 1
From Fig.4 one can find that the average winnings of group1 and group2 (R1 and R2) 
have the lowest points at m1=m2=2 and the highest points at m1=m2=4. Comparing Fig.4 
with Fig.1, one can observe that the relations among that the average winnings of group1 and 
group2 (R1 and R2) and the volatilities of systems (Vol.3) are much more complicated than 
that in the previous two simulation situations. Comparing R1 and R2 with Vol.3 at m1=m2=1 
and m1=m2=6, we can notice that agents with larger memory length get higher winning 
scores but the Vol.3 remains nearly the same. However, at m1=m2=3, Vol.3 has the highest 
value, but R1 at this point is just a little larger than that at m1=m2=1 and R2 is almost the 
same at these two points. It is interesting that R1 and R2 increase greatly at m1=m2=4 and 
Vol.3 decreases obviously at the same point. Table 3 shows that the average winnings of 
group1 and group2 (R1 and R2) greatly negatively correlated with the volatilities of systems 
(Vol.3).    
4. Concluding remarks 
The correlations between the average winnings of agents (R1 and R2) and the medians of 
local volatilities are different when agents’ memory lengths change with different 
combination of m1=m2, m1<m2=6 and m2<m1=6.   
If a designer or a manager of a complex system hope to reach an optimal state at which 
the system has high efficiency and agents have high individual performances, he or she can 
choose m1=m2=4, 5 and 6 as agents’ memory lengths, and avoid the memory length 
combinations of m1=6>m2. If he or she intend to improve the agents’ performance at the cost 
of moderately losing system efficiency, he or she can m1<m2=6 as agents’ memory lengths. 
This study result also suggests that m1 be smaller than m2 if researchers want to mix-game 
model to simulate the financial markets. 
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